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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No.  07-2987
____________
WENDELL L. JACKSON,
               Appellant,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AGENCY,
              Appellee.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 02-cv-08298)
District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 18, 2008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 26, 2008  )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
  That investigation also indicated that Jackson had two arrests for domestic abuse1
that were dismissed.
2
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Wendell L. Jackson appeals an order of the District Court granting summary
judgment to the federal government on his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation
arising under Title VII.  We will affirm.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the parties, we will recount only those facts
essential to our decision.
This case arises from Jackson’s unsuccessful attempts to become a Special Agent
of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).  Although the Philadelphia Field Division of
the DEA recommended Jackson for hire, his first application was rejected after a
background investigation revealed that he had made contradictory statements regarding
marijuana use.   On three applications, Jackson stated variously that he had used1
marijuana:  3-4 times (DEA internship application), 4-6 times (DEA Special Agent
application), and never (application for top secret security clearance).
In light of the foregoing, Jackson submitted a written apology to the Office of
Security Programs, admitting that he failed to mention his youthful indiscretions to
improve his chances at becoming a military counter-intelligence agent.  App. 551-52. 
Following Jackson’s apology, his application was reactivated, but the Chief of the
3Recruitment and Placement Section of the DEA’s Office of Personnel, Kenneth
Dickinson, did not recommend Jackson.  Pursuant to DEA policy, Chief Dickinson
referred the matter to an “1811 Hiring Panel” for review of his decision.  All three
members of the 1811 Hiring Panel voted to disapprove Jackson’s application.  Jackson
then filed an EEO complaint alleging racial discrimination, which was denied by the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
Instead of seeking review of the DOJ’s final agency action, Jackson reapplied – 
pursuant to a later vacancy announcement – for the same Special Agent position for
which he had been rejected.  Because Jackson failed to submit any new information
concerning the basis of the DEA’s prior denial of his application, the DEA treated
Jackson’s second application as a reconsideration request and referred it to Richard
Ludowig, who was Chairman of the DEA’s Reconsideration Panel.  After reviewing
Jackson’s file and finding it devoid of any new information in mitigation of Jackson’s
prior misrepresentations, Ludowig denied Jackson’s re-application without referring the
matter to a Reconsideration Panel.  Ludowig testified that he did not recall being aware of
Jackson’s prior EEO complaint at the time he denied his re-application.
Following Ludowig’s denial, Jackson added a retaliation claim, alleging that the
DEA treated his second application differently because he previously filed an EEO
complaint regarding the handling of his application.  The DOJ issued a final agency
decision finding no discrimination based on race or retaliation on account of Jackson’s
4EEO activity.  Jackson filed a timely appeal to the District Court and, following its entry
of summary judgment, filed a timely appeal here.
II.
We discern Jackson’s principal claim to be that the DEA should not have treated
his second application as a re-application and that the rejection thereof evidences a
systemic pattern and practice of racial discrimination in hiring by the DEA.  The District
Court granted the DEA summary judgment on the racial discrimination claim, finding that
Jackson did not proffer any evidence of pretext under Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d
Cir. 1994).  See Jackson v. Ashcroft, No. 02-8298, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2006).
On appeal, Jackson does not cite any evidence of record to establish a triable issue
of fact regarding pretext.  Instead, he argues that the DEA treated similarly situated white
applicants more favorably than him.  Jackson’s support of this claim is plainly
insufficient.  First, as the Government correctly notes, the so-called “affidavit” of Arthur
Reed is neither a sworn affidavit nor an unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1746.  Thus, it is invalid as evidence.  Second, the first three
white comparators cited by Jackson were hired initially, not on reconsideration.  Finally,  
Jackson cites the case of “Applicant G,” who was reconsidered after an initial rejection
for making false statements on his application.  In that case, however, the Hiring Panel
had not made a formal decision and the applicant submitted additional information to
rebut the file report that he had lied in his application.  App. 643-45, 571-73.
5In sum, Jackson has not cited any record evidence that undermines the
Government’s position that applicants who re-apply for a Special Agent position – but
who proffer no new facts in mitigation of their prior misrepresentations – are neither
entitled to a reconsideration hearing nor entitled to be considered as new applicants. 
Instead of identifying any applicants who received a reconsideration hearing in the
absence of mitigating evidence, Jackson speculates that the DEA could or should have
advised candidates that additional mitigating facts are a pre-condition for reconsideration. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that this, in fact, is a typical DEA practice or
policy.  As such, Jackson’s evidence is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of pretextual
discrimination.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Penn. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 333 (3d Cir. 2005).
III.
Jackson next claims that the District Court erred in entering summary judgment
against him on his retaliation claim.  We reject this argument out of hand because the
record is devoid of a triable issue of material fact regarding Agent Ludowig’s knowledge
about Jackson’s prior EEO complaint.  Even if Reed’s testimony constituted competent
evidence (which it does not), his speculation that Jackson’s EEO activity “would have
been” known by Ludowig is plainly insufficient to withstand the Government’s motion
for summary judgment.
For all the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
